Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/96851
Authors: 
Forges, Francoise
Salomon, Antoine
Year of Publication: 
2014
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo Working Paper 4700
Abstract: 
Under appropriate assumptions (private values and uniform punishments), the Nash equilibria of a Bayesian repeated game without discounting are payoff-equivalent to tractable, completely revealing, equilibria and can be achieved as interim cooperative solutions of the initial Bayesian game. This characterization does not apply to discounted games with patient players. In a class of public good games, the set of Nash equilibrium payoffs of the undiscounted game can be empty, while limit (perfect Bayesian) Nash equilibrium payoffs of the discounted game, as players become infinitely patient, do exist. These equilibria share some features with the ones of multi-sided reputation models.
Subjects: 
Bayesian game
incentive compatibility
individual rationality
infinitely repeated game
private values
public good
reputation
JEL: 
C73
C72
C71
D82
H41
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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