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Erscheinungsjahr: 
2014
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
CESifo Working Paper No. 4774
Verlag: 
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo), Munich
Zusammenfassung: 
Using an agency model, we show how delegation, by generating additional private information, improves dynamic incentives under limited commitment. It circumvents ratchet effects and facilitates the revelation of persistent private information through two effects: a play-hardball effect, which mitigates an efficient agent’s ratchet incentive, and a carrot effect which reduces an inefficient agent’s take-the-money-and-run incentive. Although delegation entails a loss of control, it is optimal when uncertainty about operational efficiency is large. Moreover, delegation is more effective with production complementarity. We also consider different modes of commitment to yield insights into optimal organizational boundaries.
Schlagwörter: 
agency
delegation
dynamic incentives
limited commitment
JEL: 
D82
D86
L22
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper
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