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Erscheinungsjahr: 
2014
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
CESifo Working Paper No. 4788
Verlag: 
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo), Munich
Zusammenfassung: 
We study (energy) markets with dirty incumbents and costly entry by clean producers. For intermediate entry costs, the market outcome exhibits inefficient production and inefficient entry. A policy mix of three popular regulatory instruments—taxation on polluters, feed-in tariffs for clean entrants, and taxation of consumption—cannot correct these two market failures. Feed-in tariffs and consumption taxes are ineffective instruments for implementing the first best. The second best requires feed-in tariffs or consumption taxes. For a given level of production, the instruments are ineffective in influencing the overall budget, but may be effective for other budgetary concepts.
Schlagwörter: 
taxation
feed-in tariffs
externalities
entry
pollution
JEL: 
D21
D61
H23
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper
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