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Erscheinungsjahr: 
2006
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Working Paper No. 76/2006
Verlag: 
Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaften an der Landwirtschaftlich-Gärtnerischen Fakultät, Berlin
Zusammenfassung: 
The probability that actors in economic relationships break rules increases with the profits they thus expect to earn. It decreases with the probability and level of short- and long-term losses resulting from disclosure. It also decreases with the level of social context factors and intrinsic values which shield actors from yielding to economic temptations. This paper assesses the relative merits of various scientific approaches concerned with risks in economic relationships and outlines their contribution to the study of opportunistic rule-breaking. Since the identification of (misdirected) economic incentives faced by firms and individuals represents the starting point for a systematic analysis of opportunism in any field, we also outline a microeconomic approach that systematically provides this crucial information. The approach is applied to the problem of food quality and safety threatened by opportunistic malpractice of food business operators. Its essentials are illustrated through a study which systematically searches for the temptations to break production-related rules in the poultry industries.
Schlagwörter: 
asymmetric information
control theories
economic misconduct
game theory
moral hazard
principal-agent model
opportunism
protective factors
relational risks
JEL: 
A13
K32
K42
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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