Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/96426
Authors: 
Jamison, Julian C.
Year of Publication: 
2012
Series/Report no.: 
Working Papers, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston 12-3
Abstract: 
Intuitively, we expect that players who are allowed to engage in costless communication before playing a game would be foolish to agree on an inefficient equilibrium. At the same time, however, such preplay communication has been suggested as a rationale for expecting Nash equilibrium in general. This paper presents a plausible formal model of cheap talk that distinguishes and resolves these possibilities. Players are assumed to have an unlimited opportunity to send messages before playing an arbitrary game. Using an extension of fictitious play beliefs, minimal assumptions are made concerning which messages about future actions are credible and hence contribute to final beliefs. In this environment it is shown that meaningful communication among players leads to a Nash equilibrium (NE) of the action game. Within the set of NE, efficiency then turns out to be a consequence of imposing optimality on the cheap talk portion of the extended game. This finding contrasts with previous babbling results.
Subjects: 
cheap talk
communication
coordination
efficient equilibrium
babbling
JEL: 
C72
C73
D70
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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