Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/96369 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2014
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
IAAEU Discussion Paper Series in Economics No. 07/2014
Verlag: 
University of Trier, Institute for Labour Law and Industrial Relations in the European Union (IAAEU), Trier
Zusammenfassung: 
Our study analyzes the consequences of workers' participation in the wage setting process on effort exertion. The experimental design is based on a modified giftexchange game where the degree of workers' involvement in the wage setting process is systematically varied among the workers. The experimental data reveals that workers' participation leads actually to a decline in effort exertion which can be explained by negative reciprocity of the respective worker. These results put some recently observed positive effects from workers' participation in experimental labor markets into perspective and are more in line with the ambiguous results from empirical studies.
Schlagwörter: 
Participation
labor market
gift-exchange game
personnel economics
reciprocity
JEL: 
C72
C91
J33
L23
M52
M55
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
316.86 kB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.