Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/96369
Authors: 
Franke, Jörg
Gurtoviy, Ruslan
Mertins, Vanessa
Year of Publication: 
2014
Series/Report no.: 
IAAEU Discussion Paper Series in Economics 07/2014
Abstract: 
Our study analyzes the consequences of workers' participation in the wage setting process on effort exertion. The experimental design is based on a modified giftexchange game where the degree of workers' involvement in the wage setting process is systematically varied among the workers. The experimental data reveals that workers' participation leads actually to a decline in effort exertion which can be explained by negative reciprocity of the respective worker. These results put some recently observed positive effects from workers' participation in experimental labor markets into perspective and are more in line with the ambiguous results from empirical studies.
Subjects: 
Participation
labor market
gift-exchange game
personnel economics
reciprocity
JEL: 
C72
C91
J33
L23
M52
M55
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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