Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/96363
Authors: 
De Pinto, Marco
Michaelis, Jochen
Year of Publication: 
2014
Series/Report no.: 
IAAEU Discussion Paper Series in Economics 06/2014
Abstract: 
Trade unions are typically able to convert their industrial power into political power. We show that, depending on the parameter constellation, stronger trade unions may be welfare-improving in terms of an increase in aggregate employment and output, if they successfully lobby for lower trade barriers set by the government.
Subjects: 
Trade unions
lobbying
trade liberalization
JEL: 
F13
F16
J51
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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