Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/96077 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2011
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Working Paper No. 2011-29
Verlag: 
Bar-Ilan University, Department of Economics, Ramat-Gan
Zusammenfassung: 
The form of contests for a single fixed prize can be determined by a designer who maximizes the contestants' efforts. This paper establishes that, under common knowledge of the two asymmetric contestants' prize valuations, a fair Tullock-type endogenously determined lottery is always superior to an all-pay-auction; it yields larger expected efforts (revenues) for the contest designer. If the contest can be unfair (structural discrimination is allowed), then the optimal lottery cannot be dominated by an all-pay-auction.
Schlagwörter: 
contest design
efforts (revenue) maximization
discrimination
endogenous lottery
all-pay auction
JEL: 
D70
D71
D72
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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