Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/96071
Authors: 
Milchtaich, Igal
Year of Publication: 
2009
Series/Report no.: 
Working Papers, Bar-Ilan University, Department of Economics 2008-01
Abstract: 
Players in a congestion game may differ from one another in their intrinsic preferences (e.g., the benefit they get from using a specific resource), their contribution to congestion, or both. In many cases of interest, intrinsic preferences and the negative effect of congestion are (additively or multiplicatively) separable. This paper considers the implications of separability for the existence of pure-strategy Nash equilibrium and the prospects of spontaneous convergence to equilibrium. It is shown that these properties may or may not be guaranteed, depending on the exact nature of player heterogeneity.
Subjects: 
congestion games
separable preferences
pure equilibrium
finite improvement property
potential
JEL: 
C72
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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