Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/96054
Authors: 
Milchtaich, Igal
Year of Publication: 
2008
Series/Report no.: 
Working Papers, Bar-Ilan University, Department of Economics 2008-05
Abstract: 
The equilibrium outcome of a strategic interaction between two or more people may depend on the weight they place on each other's payoff. A positive, negative or zero weight represents altruism, spite or complete selfishness, respectively. Paradoxically, the real, material payoff in equilibrium for a group of altruists may be lower than for selfish or spiteful groups. However, this can only be so if the equilibria involved are unstable. If they are stable, the total (equivalently, average) payoff can only increase or remain unchanged with an increasing degree of altruism.
Subjects: 
altruism
spite
comparative statics
strategic games
stability of equilibrium
JEL: 
C62
C72
D64
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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