Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/96024 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2009
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Working Paper No. 2009-02
Verlag: 
Bar-Ilan University, Department of Economics, Ramat-Gan
Zusammenfassung: 
We consider a two group contest over a group specific public good where each member of a group has a different benefit from the good. Our model can be interpreted in two ways: Each of the players has a non-linear investment cost in the contest, or alternatively, the returns to effort are decreasing as reflected in the contest success function. In the first part of the paper we show conditions under which freeriding decreases and consider the different properties of the equilibrium. In the second part of the paper we develop the properties of the optimal formation of the group and its affect on the equilibrium outcome.
Schlagwörter: 
contests
rent seeking
public good
heterogeneity
free-riding
orchestration of interest groups
JEL: 
D72
C72
H41
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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