Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/96018
Authors: 
Milchtaich, Igal
Year of Publication: 
2008
Series/Report no.: 
Working Papers, Bar-Ilan University, Department of Economics 2008-04
Abstract: 
Static stability of equilibrium in strategic games differs from dynamic stability in not being linked to any particular dynamical system. In other words, it does not make any assumptions about off-equilibrium behavior. Examples of static notions of stability include evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) and continuously stable strategy (CSS), both of which are meaningful or justifiable only for particular classes of games, namely, symmetric multilinear games or symmetric games with a unidimensional strategy space, respectively. This paper presents a general notion of local static stability, of which the above two are essentially special cases. It is applicable to virtually all n-person strategic games, both symmetric and asymmetric, with non-discrete strategy spaces.
Subjects: 
stability of equilibrium
static stability
JEL: 
C72
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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