Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/96013
Authors: 
Nitzan, Shmuel
Year of Publication: 
2009
Series/Report no.: 
Working Papers, Bar-Ilan University, Department of Economics 2009-18
Abstract: 
In a recent book and earlier studies, Donald Saari well clarifies the source of three classical impossibility theorems in social choice and proposes possible escape out of these negative results. The objective of this note is to illustrate the relevance of these explanations in justifying the metric approach to the social compromise with the unanimity criterion.
Subjects: 
social choice
impossibility theorems
metric approach to compromise with the unanimity criterion
JEL: 
D71
D72
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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