Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/96001
Authors: 
Brañas-Garza, Pablo
García-Muñoz, Teresa
Neuman, Shoshana
Year of Publication: 
2009
Series/Report no.: 
Working Papers, Bar-Ilan University, Department of Economics 2009-23
Abstract: 
Using an international dataset of about 35,000 subjects, this paper provides an empirical example of high-stakes incentives in relation to religious practice. First, we show that incentives (based on absolute belief) play a salient role in religious performance. Second, we find that, when both positive (heaven) and negative (hell) incentives are available, the former are more effective than the latter. Specifically, it is shown that beliefs in heaven are much more relevant than beliefs in hell when estimating the production of religious commodities (church-attendance and praying equations).
Subjects: 
carrot/stick
high-stakes incentives
rewards
punishment
economics of religion
JEL: 
C91
D64
Z13
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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