Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/95998
Authors: 
Nitzan, Shmuel
Ueda, Kaoru
Year of Publication: 
2010
Series/Report no.: 
Working Papers, Bar-Ilan University, Department of Economics 2010-08
Abstract: 
The characteristics of endogenously determined sharing rules and the group-size paradox are studied in a model of group contest with the following features: (i) The prize has mixed privatepublic good characteristics. (ii) Groups can differ in marginal cost of effort and their membership size. (iii) In each group the members decide how much effort to put without observing the sharing rules of the other groups. We provide simple characterizations of the relationship between group characteristics, performance of the competing groups (winning probability and per capita expected utility) and the type of sharing rules they select. Interestingly, richer and more efficient groups or groups with larger valuation of the prize tend to be more equalitarian. We also clarify under what circumstances such tendency is due to larger membership.
Subjects: 
collective contest
mixed public-good prize
endogenous sharing rules
the group-size paradox
JEL: 
D70
D71
D72
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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