Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/95897
Authors: 
Kerber, Wolfgang
Wendel, Julia
Year of Publication: 
2014
Series/Report no.: 
Joint Discussion Paper Series in Economics 22-2014
Abstract: 
The vertical allocation of regulatory powers within the European two-level system of network sector regulation is analysed from the perspective of the economic theory of legal federalism. The analysis shows that sophisticated combinations of harmonised European rules along with sufficient scope for decentralised decisions of national regulators seem to be optimal. Especially interesting is that networks of regulatory authorities (as BEREC in telecommunications) can play an important role in regard to balancing the advantages and disadvantages of (de)centralisation. Whereas in regard to telecommunication a further shifting of regulatory powers to the EU level cannot be recommended, both in energy and railway markets it might still be necessary to strengthen the regulatory power of the EU.
Subjects: 
EU sector regulation
legal federalism
regulatory networks
telecommunication
JEL: 
K23
H77
F15
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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