Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/95868 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2014
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
WZB Discussion Paper No. SP II 2014-202
Verlag: 
Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB), Berlin
Zusammenfassung: 
We test the effect of the amount of information on the strategies played by others in the theoretically strategy-proof Top Trading Cycles (TTC) mechanism. We find that providing limited information on the strategies played by others has a negative and significant effect in truth-telling rates relative to full or no information about others' strategies. Subjects report truthfully more often when either full information or no information on the strategies played by others is available. Our results have potentially important implications for the design of markets based on strategy-proof matching algorithms.
Schlagwörter: 
school choice
top trading cycles
strategy-proofness
JEL: 
C78
D79
D80
I20
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
1.05 MB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.