Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/95868
Authors: 
Guillen, Pablo
Hakimov, Rustamdjan
Year of Publication: 
2014
Series/Report no.: 
WZB Discussion Paper SP II 2014-202
Abstract: 
We test the effect of the amount of information on the strategies played by others in the theoretically strategy-proof Top Trading Cycles (TTC) mechanism. We find that providing limited information on the strategies played by others has a negative and significant effect in truth-telling rates relative to full or no information about others' strategies. Subjects report truthfully more often when either full information or no information on the strategies played by others is available. Our results have potentially important implications for the design of markets based on strategy-proof matching algorithms.
Subjects: 
school choice
top trading cycles
strategy-proofness
JEL: 
C78
D79
D80
I20
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.