Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/95861
Authors: 
Feicht, Robert
Grimm, Veronika
Seebauer, Michael
Year of Publication: 
2014
Series/Report no.: 
IWQW Discussion Paper Series 03/2014
Abstract: 
We experimentally investigate a Bertrand market with homogenous goods where sellers may behave socially responsible by donating a share of their profits to an existing non-profit organization. In our experiment, we find that this Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) component is used independent of its credibility. However, market outcomes in terms of prices and profits do neither significantly differ with respect to the credibility of the CSR component nor in comparison to a market without the availability of CSR components. Moreover, prices have the main impact on purchase decisions while higher donations only affect purchase decisions when they are credible and price differences are negligible. We conclude that competition severely limits the possibility to attract customers with CSR components. Actual donations are small and the burden induced by the CSR components is shifted partly to the buyers resulting in equal profits in all treatments.
Subjects: 
Corporate Social Responsibility
Competition
Charitable Giving
Experiment
JEL: 
C92
D22
M31
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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