Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/95677
Authors: 
Abdessalam, A. H.
Year of Publication: 
2014
Citation: 
[Journal:] Economics: The Open-Access, Open-Assessment E-Journal [Volume:] 8 [Issue:] 2014-12 [Pages:] 1-20
Abstract: 
In this paper, the author analyzes the behavior of local governments in capital taxation when the financial choices in terms of the quality of public goods are made done by a central planner. More specifically, he asks the question of whether a local government has an interest in taxing the mobile factor in addition to the tax on representative households. Through a comparison of social welfare given the strategies chosen by local governments, the author shows that whatever the quality and cost of public goods, a local government always has an interest in taxing the mobile factor. This leads to a Nash equilibrium in the dominant strategy in their model.
Subjects: 
Tax competition
public goods
quality
welfare
taxation
JEL: 
D00
H20
H41
H70
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/
Document Type: 
Article

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