Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/95640
Authors: 
Tangerås, Thomas P.
Tåg, Joacim
Year of Publication: 
2014
Series/Report no.: 
IFN Working Paper 1005
Abstract: 
We analyse network competition in a market with international calls. National regulatory agencies (NRAs) have incentives to set regulated termination rates above marginal cost to extract rent from international call termination. International network ownership and deregulation are alternatives to combat the incentives of NRAs to distort termination rates. We provide conditions under which each of these policies increase efficiency and aggregate welfare. Our findings provide theoretical support for recent policy initiatives by the European Commission.
Subjects: 
Cross-border ownership
decentralized regulation
international markets
network competition
telecoms
termination rates
JEL: 
L51
L96
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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