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Erscheinungsjahr: 
2012
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Quaderni di Dipartimento No. 159
Verlag: 
Università degli Studi di Pavia, Dipartimento di Economia Politica e Metodi Quantitativi (EPMQ), Pavia
Zusammenfassung: 
In this article we discuss the dynamics of organizational change when agents have heterogeneous initial conjectures and do learn. In this framework, conjectural equilibrium is defined as a steady state of the learning process, and all the adjustment occurs in disequilibrium. We discuss the properties of the system under different “rationality” assumptions, and using well-known learning algorithms. We prove analytically that multiplicity of equilibria, and failure of good organizational routines, cannot be ruled out: better, they are fairly probable. Stability is a crucial matter: it is shown to depend on initial conjectures. Finally, learning does not necessarily select the best.
JEL: 
C67
E01
F14
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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