Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/95317 
Year of Publication: 
2012
Series/Report no.: 
Quaderni di Dipartimento No. 159
Publisher: 
Università degli Studi di Pavia, Dipartimento di Economia Politica e Metodi Quantitativi (EPMQ), Pavia
Abstract: 
In this article we discuss the dynamics of organizational change when agents have heterogeneous initial conjectures and do learn. In this framework, conjectural equilibrium is defined as a steady state of the learning process, and all the adjustment occurs in disequilibrium. We discuss the properties of the system under different “rationality” assumptions, and using well-known learning algorithms. We prove analytically that multiplicity of equilibria, and failure of good organizational routines, cannot be ruled out: better, they are fairly probable. Stability is a crucial matter: it is shown to depend on initial conjectures. Finally, learning does not necessarily select the best.
JEL: 
C67
E01
F14
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size
280.76 kB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.