Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/95130
Authors: 
Sundén, David
Weibull, Jörgen W.
Year of Publication: 
1997
Series/Report no.: 
IUI Working Paper 478
Abstract: 
This note elaborates an extension of the paper 'Social Norms, the Welfare State, and Voting' by Lindbeck, Nyberg, and Weibull [1]. That paper studies the effects of a social norm against living off others work. In the welfare-state context of their model, this means that individuals who live on public transfers experience disutility. One limitation in the model is that the individual's choice is binary: either to work full time or not at all. Here we allow individuals to choose working hours on a continuous scale. We derive a fixed-point equation that determines all individuals number of work hours, and show that the limitation to a binary choice is not binding if individuals have Cobb-Douglas preferences and no non-labor incomes.
Subjects: 
Sociology
Labour Market
JEL: 
A14
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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