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Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
1997
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
IUI Working Paper No. 489
Verlag: 
The Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IUI), Stockholm
Zusammenfassung: 
Evolutionary game theory studies the robustness of strategy profiles and sets of strategy profiles with respect to evolutionary forces in games played repeatedly in large populations of boundedly rational agents. The approach is macro oriented in the sense of focusing on the strategy distribution in the interacting population(s). Some main features of this approach are here outlined, and connections with learning models and standard notions of game-theoretic rationality and equilibrium are discussed. Some desiderata and results for robust long-run predictions are considered.
Schlagwörter: 
Games
JEL: 
C70
C72
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

Datei(en):
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