Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/95078
Authors: 
Weibull, Jörgen W.
Year of Publication: 
1997
Series/Report no.: 
IUI Working Paper 489
Abstract: 
Evolutionary game theory studies the robustness of strategy profiles and sets of strategy profiles with respect to evolutionary forces in games played repeatedly in large populations of boundedly rational agents. The approach is macro oriented in the sense of focusing on the strategy distribution in the interacting population(s). Some main features of this approach are here outlined, and connections with learning models and standard notions of game-theoretic rationality and equilibrium are discussed. Some desiderata and results for robust long-run predictions are considered.
Subjects: 
Games
JEL: 
C70
C72
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size
754.54 kB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.