Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/95045 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2000
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
IUI Working Paper No. 535
Verlag: 
The Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IUI), Stockholm
Zusammenfassung: 
This paper presents a unified analytical framework for the analysis of social security reform. It discusses reform along two dimensions: Pay-As-You-Go versus fully funded on the one hand, and actuarial versus non-actuarial on the other. Making the system more actuarial entails a trade-off between less distorted work incentives and intra-generational redistribution. Increasing the degree of funding entails a trade-off between more distorted work incentives, and redistribution in favor of future generations. If a PAYGO system already has strong actuarial elements, the additional welfare gain from making it fully funded derives from the possibility of portfolio diversification.
Schlagwörter: 
Pension reform
social security
funded pensions
work incentives
saving
JEL: 
H55
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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