Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/95001
Authors: 
Weibull, Jörgen W.
Saez-Marti, Maria
Year of Publication: 
1998
Series/Report no.: 
IUI Working Paper 507
Abstract: 
In the models of Young (1993a,b), boundedly rational individuals are recurrently matched to play a game, and they play myopic best replies to the recent history of play. It could therefore be an advantage to instead play a myopic best reply to the myopic best reply, something boundedly rational players might conceivably also do. We investigate this possibility in the context of Young's (1993b)bargaining model. It turns out that 'cleverness' in this respect indeed does have an advantage in some cases. However, if all individuals are equally informed about past play, in a statistical sense, then the Nash bargaining solution remains the unique long-run outcome when the mutation rate goes to zero.
Subjects: 
Evolution
Bargaining
Bounded rationality
Game theory
JEL: 
C70
C78
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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