Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/94988
Authors: 
Fridolfsson, Sven-Olof
Stennek, Johan
Year of Publication: 
2000
Series/Report no.: 
IUI Working Paper 542
Abstract: 
Anticompetitive mergers increase competitors' profits, since they reduce competition. Using a model of endogenous mergers, we show that such mergers nevertheless may reduce the competitors' share-prices. Thus, event-studies can not detect anti-competitive mergers.
Subjects: 
Mergers & Acquisitions
Event Studies
Antitrust
Coalition Formation
JEL: 
G14
G34
L12
L41
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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