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Erscheinungsjahr: 
1997
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
IUI Working Paper No. 476
Verlag: 
The Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IUI), Stockholm
Zusammenfassung: 
This paper analyzes the interplay between social norms and economic incentives in the context of work decisions in the modern welfare state. We assume that to live off one's own work is a social norm, and that the larger the population fraction adhering to this norm, the more intensely it is felt by the individual. Individuals face two choices, one economic, whether to work or live off public transfers, and one political, how large the transfer should be. The model highlights certain factors determining the size of the welfare state.
Schlagwörter: 
Welfare Economics
Decision Making
Incentives
JEL: 
D60
D81
O31
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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