Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/94845 
Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
1990
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
IUI Working Paper No. 288
Verlag: 
The Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IUI), Stockholm
Zusammenfassung: 
This paper analyses the behaviour of competing governments in the EC with respect to inflows of direct investment. Solving a non-cooperative sequential bargaining game in which host countries gain from direct investment through tax revenue or imposition of forced local subcontracting, it is concluded that a successful 1992 program does not allow discrimination of direct investment. As they bid against each other for the attraction of projects, the EC countries will give away rents generated by protectionism. Hence, multinational firms may temper the emergence of trading 'blocs' through their ability to play individual countries against each other.
Schlagwörter: 
Direct investment
Game theory
Multinational firms
JEL: 
C72
C78
F21
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
1.06 MB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.