Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/94720
Authors: 
Weibull, Jörgen W.
van Damme, Eric
Year of Publication: 
1998
Series/Report no.: 
IUI Working Paper 501
Abstract: 
Bergin and Lipman (1996) show that the refinement effect from the random mutations in the adaptive dynamics in Kandori, Mailath and Rob (1993) and Young (1993) is due to restrictions on how these mutation rates vary across population states. We here model these mutation rates as endogenously determined mistake probabilities, by assuming that players at some cost or disutility can control their mistake probability, i.e., the probability of implementing another pure strategy than intented. This is shown to corroborate the result in Kandori-Mailath-Rob and Young that the risk-dominant equilibrium is selected in 2 x 2-coordination games.
Subjects: 
Evolution
Game theory
Mutations
JEL: 
C70
C72
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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