Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/94613 
Year of Publication: 
2000
Series/Report no.: 
Claremont Colleges Working Papers in Economics No. 2000-18
Publisher: 
Claremont McKenna College, Department of Economics, Claremont, CA
Abstract: 
This paper illustrates two reasonable political decision mechanisms by which fiscal policy generates endogenous growth under a constant returns to scale production technology, absent externalities. Based on the dynamics induced by various policy choices, we demonstrate that policies that maximize capital deepening generate balanced growth and are Pareto optimal. In contrast, policies chosen by the median voter produce balanced growth, but are suboptimal.
Subjects: 
public investment
positive political economy
median voter theorem
endogenous growth
JEL: 
P16
E62
O40
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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