Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/94596
Authors: 
Filson, Darren
Fabre, Fernando
Nava, Alfredo
Rodriguez, Paola
Year of Publication: 
2001
Series/Report no.: 
Claremont Colleges Working Papers in Economics 2001-01
Abstract: 
The current literature on sharing contracts emphasizes the importance of asymmetric information and typically assumes that one party is risk neutral while the other is risk averse. This paper describes a real-world contract that is widely used - the movie exhibition contract - and argues that asymmetric information is not the main feature of the environment that leads to sharing. The explanation that fits the facts better is simply that distributors and exhibitors are both risk averse. The analysis suggests that two-sided risk aversion is important in determining contracts.
Subjects: 
principal agent
licensing
entertainment
film
rental
JEL: 
L14
L22
L82
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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