Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/94329
Authors: 
Friedman, Eric
Shenker, Scott
Year of Publication: 
1998
Series/Report no.: 
Working Papers, Department of Economics, Rutgers, The State University of New Jersey 1998-21
Abstract: 
We address the problem of learning and implementation on the Internet. When agents play repeated games in distributed environments like the Internet, they have very limited {\em a priori} information about the other players and the payoff matrix, and the play can be highly asynchronous. Consequently, standard solution concepts like Nash equilibria, or even the serially undominated set, do not apply in such a setting. To construct more appropriate solution concepts, we first describe the essential properties that constitute ``reasonable'' learning behavior in distributed environments. We then study the convergence behavior of such algorithms; these results lead us to propose rather non traditional solutions concepts for this context. Finally, we discuss implementation of social choice functions with these solution concepts.
Subjects: 
Implementation
Internet
Learning
JEL: 
C72
D83
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size
364.88 kB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.