Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/94233
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2012
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Working Paper No. 2012-07
Verlag: 
Rutgers University, Department of Economics, New Brunswick, NJ
Zusammenfassung: 
We show that supermodular games satisfying sequential better-reply security possess a pure strategy perfect equilibrium and a strategically stable set of pure strategies. We illustrate that, in continuous supermodular games, perfect equilibria may contain weakly dominated actions. Moreover, in discontinuous supermodular games, perfect equilibria may involve play of actions in the interior of the set of weakly dominated actions. We prove that when the set of undominated actions is a sublattice, supermodular games satisfying sequential better-reply security possess pure strategy perfect equilibria that can be obtained as limits of undominated actions.
Schlagwörter: 
supermodular game
weakly dominated strategy
trembling-hand perfect equilibrium
strategically stable set
supermodular game
weakly dominated strategy
trembling-hand perfect equilibrium
strategically stable set
JEL: 
C72
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
371.22 kB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.