Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/94224
Authors: 
Isgin, Ebru
Sopher, Barry
Year of Publication: 
2013
Series/Report no.: 
Working Papers, Department of Economics, Rutgers, The State University of New Jersey 2013-03
Abstract: 
The paper studies the role of information transparency on fairness concerns, welfare and efficiency. When the firm's productivity and ultimately profits are revealed, wage offers induce relatively fair divisions of potential gains and workers respond with higher performance. Workers respond not only to wages but also to firms' intentions concerning fairness. Information transparency serves as a mechanism that promotes fairness and performance while the lack of transparency results in reduced earnings for workers and market inefficiency.
Subjects: 
Experiments
Incomplete Contracts
Fairness
Information Transparency
experimental economics
incomplete contracts
fairness
information transparency
JEL: 
C9
D8
J
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size
849.88 kB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.