Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/94180
Authors: 
Ensthaler, Ludwig
Giebe, Thomas
Year of Publication: 
2010
Series/Report no.: 
SFB/TR 15 Discussion Paper 310
Abstract: 
We present a new dynamic auction for procurement problems where payments are bounded by a hard budget constraint and money does not enter the procurer's objective function.
Subjects: 
Auctions
Mechanism Design
Knapsack Problem
Dominant Strategy
Budget
Procurement
JEL: 
D21
D44
D45
D82
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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