Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/94166
Authors: 
Staal, Klaas
Year of Publication: 
2006
Series/Report no.: 
SFB/TR 15 Discussion Paper 104
Abstract: 
In this paper I examine the incentives of regions to unite, to separate and to provide public goods. Separation allows for greater influence over the nature of political decision making while unification allows regions to exploit economies of scale in the provision of public goods. When public good provision is relatively inexpensive, separation occurs since individuals want to assert greater influence, while for intermediate costs of public good provision, separation can be explained by the desires for greater influence as well as for more public goods. Compared with the social optimum, there are excessive incentives for public good provision as well as excessive incentives for separation.
Subjects: 
unification
separation
public good provision
voting
JEL: 
D7
H2
H7
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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