Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/94156 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2013
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
SFB/TR 15 Discussion Paper No. 436
Verlag: 
Sonderforschungsbereich/Transregio 15 - Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems (GESY), München
Zusammenfassung: 
We consider optimal pricing by a profit-maximizing platform running a dynamic search and matching market. Buyers and sellers enter in cohorts over time, meet and bargain under private information. The optimal centralized mechanism, which involves posting a bid-ask spread, can be decentralized through participation fees charged by the intermediary to both sides. The sum of buyers' and sellers' fees equals the sum of inverse hazard rates of the marginal types and their ratio equals the ratio of buyers' and sellers' bargaining weights. We also show that a monopolistic intermediary in a search market may be welfare enhancing.
Schlagwörter: 
Dynamic random matching
two-sided private information
intermediaries
JEL: 
D82
D83
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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