Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/94144
Authors: 
Strausz, Roland
Year of Publication: 
2004
Series/Report no.: 
SFB/TR 15 Discussion Paper 27
Abstract: 
This paper offers an explanation why a principal may demand too much paperwork from a subordinate: Due to limited liability and moral hazard a principal is unable to appropriate all rents. Internal paperwork allows a more accurate monitoring of the agent and enables the principal to appropriate a larger part of the agent's rent. In her decision the principal disregards the agent's cost increase of more internal paperwork. Consequently, the requested amount of internal paperwork may be too high from both the agent's personal point of view and the organization as a whole.
JEL: 
D23
D82
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.