Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/94133
Authors: 
Kovenock, Dan
Morath, Florian
Münster, Johannes
Year of Publication: 
2010
Series/Report no.: 
SFB/TR 15 Discussion Paper 334
Abstract: 
We study the incentives to share private information ahead of contests, such as markets with promotional competition, procurement contests, or R&D. We consider the cases where firms have (i) independent values and (ii) common values of winning the contest. In both cases, when decisions to share information are made independently, sharing information is strictly dominated. With independent values, an industry-wide agreement to share information can arise in equilibrium. Expected effort is lower with than without information sharing. With common values, an industry-wide agreement to share information never arises in equilibrium. Expected effort is higher with than without information sharing.
Subjects: 
information sharing
contest
all-pay auction
JEL: 
D82
D43
D44
L13
D74
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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