Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/94125
Authors: 
Giebe, Thomas
Year of Publication: 
2010
Series/Report no.: 
SFB/TR 15 Discussion Paper 307
Abstract: 
We consider procurement of an innovation from heterogeneous sellers. Innovations are random but depend on unobservable effort and private information. We compare two procurement mechanisms where potential sellers first bid in an auction for admission to an innovation contest. After the contest, an innovation is procured employing either a fixed prize or a first-price auction. We characterize Bayesian Nash equilibria such that both mechanisms are payoff-equivalent and induce the same efforts and innovations. In these equilibria, signaling in the entry auction does not occur since contestants play a simple strategy that does not depend on rivals' private information.
Subjects: 
Contest
Auction
Innovation
Research
R\&D
Procurement
Signaling
JEL: 
D21
D44
D82
H57
O31
O32
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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