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Autoren: 
Schumacher, Heiner
Kesternich, Iris
Kosfeld, Michael
Winter, Joachim
Datum: 
2014
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
SFB/TR 15 Discussion Paper No. 453
Zusammenfassung: 
We analyze distributional preferences in games in which a decider chooses the provision of a good that benefits a receiver and creates costs for a group of payers. The average decider takes into account the welfare of all parties and has concerns for efficiency. However, she attaches similar weights to small and large groups so that she neglects large provision costs that are dispersed among many payers. This holds regardless of whether the decider benefits from the provision or not. A CES utility function which rationalizes average behavior implies altruism in bilateral situations and welfare-damaging actions when costs are dispersed.
Schlagwörter: 
Social Preferences
Distribution Games
Concentrated Benefits and Dispersed Costs
JEL: 
C91
D63
H00
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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