Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/94108 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2009
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
SFB/TR 15 Discussion Paper No. 270
Verlag: 
Sonderforschungsbereich/Transregio 15 - Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems (GESY), München
Zusammenfassung: 
In our paper targets, by setting a reserve price, screen acquirers on their (expected) ability to generate merger-speci?c synergies. Both empirical evidence and many common merger models suggest that the di?erence between high- and low-synergy mergers becomes smaller during booms. This implies that the target's opportunity cost for sorting out relatively less ?tting acquirers increases and, hence, targets screen less tightly during booms, which leads to a hike in merger activity. Our screening mechanism not only predicts that merger activity is intense during economic booms and subdued during recessions but is also consistent with other stylized facts about takeovers and generates novel testable predictions.
Schlagwörter: 
Takeovers
Merger Waves
Defense Tactics
Screening
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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