Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/94107
Authors: 
von Scarpatetti, Benedikt
Wasser, Cédric
Year of Publication: 
2010
Series/Report no.: 
SFB/TR 15 Discussion Paper 293
Abstract: 
We consider a model of oligopolistic firms that have private information about their cost structure. Prior to competing in the market a competitive advantage, i.e., a cost reducing technology, is allocated to a subset of the firms by means of a multi-object auction. After the auction either all bids or only the prices to be paid are revealed to all firms. This provides an opportunity for signaling. Whether there exists an equilibrium in which bids perfectly identify the bidders' costs generally depends on the type and fierceness of the market competition, the specific auction format, and the bid announcement policy.
Subjects: 
Auction
Oligopoly
Signaling
JEL: 
D44
L13
D43
D82
C72
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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