Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/94090 
Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2008
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
SFB/TR 15 Discussion Paper No. 242
Verlag: 
Sonderforschungsbereich/Transregio 15 - Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems (GESY), München
Zusammenfassung: 
When investments are non-verifiable, inducing cooperative investments with simple contracts may not be as difficult as previously thought. Indeed, modeling 'expectation damages' close to legal practice, we show that the default remedy of contract law induces the first best. Yet, in order to lower informational requirements of courts, parties may opt for a 'specific performance' regime which grants the breached-against buyer an option to choose 'restitution' if the tender's value falls below some (exogenously given) quality threshold. In order to implement this regime, no more information needs to be verifiable than is implicitly assumed in Che and Hausch (1999).
Schlagwörter: 
breach remedies
imcomplete contracts
cooperative investments
JEL: 
K12
L22
J41
C70
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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