Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/94085
Authors: 
Gürtler, Oliver
Year of Publication: 
2006
Series/Report no.: 
SFB/TR 15 Discussion Paper 113
Abstract: 
In this paper, a principal's decision between delegating two tasks or handling one of the two tasks herself is analyzed. We assume that the principal uses both, formal contracts and informal agreements sustained by the value of future relationships (relational contracts) as incentive device. It is found that the principal is less likely to delegate both tasks in a dynamic setting than in a static one (where formal contracts are the only feasible incentive device), as handling one task herself enables a much wider use of relational contracts.
Subjects: 
Job design
relational contracts
formal contracts
delegation
JEL: 
D82
J33
L23
M52
M54
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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