Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/94084
Authors: 
Schweinzer, Paul
Year of Publication: 
2006
Series/Report no.: 
SFB/TR 15 Discussion Paper 138
Abstract: 
We consider a Rothschild-Stiglitz-Spence labour market screening model and employ a centralised mechanism to coordinate the efficient matching of workers to firms. This mechanism can be thought of as operated by a recruitment agency, an employment office or head hunter. In a centralised descending-bid, multi-item procurement auction, workers submitwage-bids for each job and are assigned stable jobs as equilibrium outcome. We compare this outcome to independent, sequential hiring by firms and conclude that, in general, a stable assignment can only be implemented if firms coordinate to some extent.
Subjects: 
Matching
Multi-item auctions
Sequential auctions
Screening
JEL: 
C78
D44
E24
J41
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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